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ABSTRACT
Earnings are a key fi rm- performance yardstick for investors, but are not always reliable as they may 
be manipulated by managers. In this study, we analyze the relationship between earnings quality 
and debt levels of fi rms in the hospitality sector, using a sample of 642 fi rms from 26 countries for 
the 2002– 2016 period. Results show that hospitality fi rms with higher fi nancial leverage manage less 
their earnings. However, this fi nding holds only for companies in countries with stronger investor 
protection. As such, some interesting implications of the leverage- earnings quality relationship are 
revealed for investors, lenders, and professionals in the hospitality industry.
Keywords: earnings quality, fi nancial leverage, hospitality industry, international study
Introduction
Th e hospitality industry is characterized by high lev-
els of competition, risk, capital intensity, and sen-
sitivity to changes in the economy and consumer 
spending (Singal, 2015). Due to their geographical 
dispersion and their signifi cant investments in tan-
gible assets (land, building, and equipment), hospi-
tality fi rms usually demand more fi nancial debt than 
fi rms from other industries (Li & Singal, 2019; Ser-
rasqueiro & Nunes, 2014; Tang & Jang, 2007). Singal 
(2015) found that the hospitality and tourism indus-
try shows signifi cant higher leverage ratios than 
other industries in a study of the S&P 1500 index 
over 21 years. In addition, recent fi nancial data con-
fi rmed this distinctive feature of the industry. For 
1 Restaurant & Dining ranks 2nd, Hotel & Gaming ranks 18th, and Recreation ranks 42nd out of 94 sectors. For more details, see 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/. 
instance, Restaurant & Dining as well as Hotel & 
Gaming rank among the top most leveraged sectors 
in the United States.1 As a consequence, academic 
research has extensively been investigating the 
motivations of the hospitality industry to demand 
more fi nancial debt (Karadeniz et al., 2009; Pacheco 
& Tavares, 2017; Seo et al., 2017; Tang & Jang, 2007; 
Upneja & Dalbor, 2001a; Upneja & Dalbor, 2001b; 
Upneja & Dalbor, 2001c).
In contrast, the consequences of fi nancial lever-
age in the hospitality sector have received little aca-
demic attention. Various studies have investigated 
the association between debt and fi nancial perfor-
mance using data from Indian hotel chains (Madan, 
2007), U.K. hotels (Phillips & Sipahioglu, 2004), U.S. 
restaurants (Jang & Tang, 2009; Tsai & Gu, 2007a; 
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Yoon & Jang, 2005), and U.S. casinos (Seo, 2016; Tsai 
& Gu, 2007b). Dewally et al. (2017) documented 
the detrimental eff ect of heavy debt fi nancing by 
showing that more leveraged hospitality fi rms are 
less likely to make large investments while Gim et 
al. (2019) showed the deterrence eff ect of fi nancial 
leverage on earnings management using a sample of 
U.S. restaurants. Th us, the empirical literature on the 
consequences of leverage in the hospitality indus-
try remains relatively scant and mainly focused on 
economic or fi nancial consequences. To the best of 
our knowledge, there are not yet empirical studies 
exploring other potential side eff ects at the interna-
tional level. In this study, we analyze the impact of 
fi nancial leverage on earnings quality across various 
countries in the hospitality industry.
It is well documented that insiders (e.g., CEOs or 
CFOs) use their discretion to manage accounting 
information and, therefore, earnings do not refl ect a 
company’s true economic reality. Healy and Wahlen 
(1999) defi ne earnings management as occurring 
when “managers use judgment in fi nancial report-
ing and in structuring transactions to alter fi nancial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company, 
or to infl uence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers” (p. 368). As earnings 
are used by capital providers for investment deci-
sions or performance evaluation, it is particularly 
important that earnings refl ect the true corporate 
performance and are not managed (Dechow, Ge, & 
Schrand, 2010; Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Despite the 
importance of earnings management in mainstream 
fi nance and accounting literature, it has received 
scant attention in the hospitality industry, although 
extreme examples of earnings management involv-
ing hospitality managers captured a great deal of 
attention during past decades. In 1998, it was dis-
covered that Cendant Corporation, a marketer and 
hotel franchiser, infl ated revenues by more than half 
a billion USD using accounting techniques, which 
led to a $19 billion loss in market value when the 
information was released. Before it fi led for bank-
ruptcy in 1999, Boston Chicken, a restaurant fran-
chise, restated $300 million in revenues from loans 
made to franchisees and start- up costs. In addition, 
the company kept losses off  the books by parking 
transactions at affi  liates (Markham, 2015). A last 
example is Krispy Kreme, the doughnut maker, 
which had to restate its earnings downward in 2004 
because it was found guilty of channel stuffi  ng (the 
company was sending twice their usual shipments 
to franchisees at the end of each quarter in order to 
boost revenues).
Th e relationship between debt and earnings man-
agement is not obvious. On the one hand, leverage 
acts as a fi rm- level disciplinary mechanism on man-
agers, as debtholders usually enhance their mon-
itoring activities (Jensen, 1986). Indeed, creditors 
need to make sure debt covenants are respected 
and, thus, closely monitor the quality of accounting 
information disclosed by managers. On the other 
hand, managers may be tempted to manage earn-
ings to limit the pressure coming from debtholders. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argued that manag-
ers are more likely to use accounting methods that 
increase earnings when the debt/equity ratio is high. 
Such an association exists because disclosing higher 
earnings allows a better negotiation of the quantity 
of debt and a decrease of the cost of debt. Further-
more, increased earnings may help avoid breaching 
debt covenants. DeAngelo et al. (1994) found that 
companies close to violating their covenants adjust 
their earnings downward. Given the two potential 
opposite directional eff ects of fi nancial leverage on 
earnings quality, there is a need to determine which 
one dominates.
When considering the relationship between debt 
and earnings management, country-level disci-
plinary mechanisms, such as the strength of inves-
tor legal protection (Ball et al., 2000; Leuz et al., 
2003), should not to be ignored. In countries with 
strong investor protection, litigation risk is higher 
(Choi & Wong, 2007; Choi, Kim, et al., 2008; Fran-
cis & Wang, 2008), which may prevent managers 
from misreporting earnings. Conversely, when 
investor protection is weak, managers have more 
incentives to distort fi nancial information to acquire 
private benefi ts (Leuz et al., 2003). As a result, it is 
worthwhile to investigate the association between 
fi nancial leverage and earnings quality in diff erent 
institutional contexts.
Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of 
7,194 fi rm- year observations, covering 15 years 
(2002– 16) for 642 unique fi rms in the hospitality 
industry from 26 countries. We fi nd two key results. 
First, when fi rms have more fi nancial leverage, 
lower earnings management is detected (i.e., higher 
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earnings’ quality). Th is result therefore supports the 
idea of eff ective monitoring carried out by debt-
holders. Second, the positive association between 
fi nancial leverage and earnings quality holds only 
in countries with a strong investor protection. Th is 
result suggests that fi nancial leverage has a posi-
tive consequence when institutions in place pro-
tect shareholders from managers’ misbehavior (i.e., 
earnings management in our case). To ensure the 
robustness of our results, we used three proxies for 
earnings quality (Dechow et al., 1995; Jones, 1991; 
Kothari et al., 2005). In addition, we control that our 
results are neither driven by the presence of some 
specifi c countries nor by the debt maturity struc-
ture. Finally, we rule out the presence of endogene-
ity arising from the fact that fi nancial leverage does 
not vary randomly.
Our paper contributes to the literature in three 
respects. First, by analyzing the impact of fi nancial 
leverage on fi nancial information quality, we fi ll a 
gap identifi ed by scholars regarding research in hos-
pitality management. As far as debt use is concerned, 
Tsai, Pan, and Lee (2011) noted that “.  .  .  there are 
few empirical studies of this topic in hospitality 
fi rms. Th is could be an interesting topic to explore, 
contributing to both the hospitality fi nancial man-
agement fi eld and mainstream fi nance literature” (p. 
952). In this vein, we no longer consider leverage as 
a fi nancial decision or a capital structure parame-
ter to explain but rather envisage leverage as an 
explanatory independent variable. We are thus able 
to adopt a downstream perspective, which pushes 
forward previous upstream literature (Dalbor et 
al., 2007; Karadeniz et al., 2009; Pacheco & Tavares, 
2017; Seo et al., 2017; Tang & Jang, 2007; Upneja & 
Dalbor, 2001a; Upneja & Dalbor, 2001b; Upneja & 
Dalbor, 2001c; Upneja & Dalbor, 2009).
Second, our study renews interest in the fi eld of 
hospitality research for a somehow neglected topic— 
earnings management. Sousa Paiva at al. (2016) 
conducted an extensive review of the hospitality 
management and accounting literature and con-
cluded that “there is still a lack of empirical research 
on fi nancial accounting and (that) scholars should 
strive to further the currently limited knowledge in 
the area” (p. 88). More specifi cally, they suggested 
paying special attention to the analysis of earnings 
management. Th is emphasis on earnings manage-
ment is particularly important with regards to the 
contractual role of accounting information for hos-
pitality fi rms’ capital providers (Jeon et al., 2006).
Th ird, by adopting a broader perspective com-
pared to previous literature and placing our study in 
a global context, we contribute to the literature aim-
ing at understanding the determinants of earnings 
quality in the hospitality industry (Gim et al., 2019; 
Parte Esteban & Jesus Such Devesa, 2011; Parte 
Esteban & Ferrer García, 2014; Seetah, 2017). As 
the hospitality and tourism industry is highly inter-
nationalized (D’Amore, 1998; Minghetti & Buhalis, 
2010; Song et al., 2018), we take this dimension into 
account by comparing fi rms from 26 countries and 
by highlighting distinct associations between lever-
age and earnings management in diff erent institu-
tional contexts.
Th e rest of the paper is structured as follows. In 
the second section, we review the relevant literature 
and introduce our research questions. In the third 
section, we describe our research design. Results 
are presented and discussed in the fourth section. 
Finally, we conclude in the last section.
Literature Review and Research Questions
Financial Leverage and Earnings Quality
Since Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), research in fi nance has analyzed 
the consequences of fi nancial debt on the value (or 
performance) of fi rms. With the development of the 
positive accounting theory by Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986), researchers have started investigating the 
impact of fi nancial leverage on earnings quality. 
Th e underlying hypothesis is that managers try to 
maximize their own interests (i.e., moral hazard) 
in a context of asymmetric information, which 
notably leads them to manage earnings. Healy and 
Wahlen (1999), among others, suggested that man-
agers have various motivations to disclose earnings 
that do not refl ect the true economic performance 
of the fi rm. First, earnings management may infl u-
ence the compensation of top executives through 
bonuses related to accounting performance. Second, 
it may also impact contractual relations with various 
stakeholders, especially with debtholders. Th ird, the 
disclosure of managed earnings may aff ect the valu-
ation of public fi rms through the revisions of price 
targets and recommendations provided by fi nancial 
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analysts (e.g., Krispy Kreme had to restate its earn-
ings downward in 2004 because it was discovered 
that the company boosted sales artifi cially at the end 
of each quarter to meet earnings forecasts). Finally, 
it may also aff ect the perceptions of regulators and, 
therefore, the content of some industry regulations 
(e.g., anti- trust regulation).
Regarding the impact of fi nancial leverage on 
earnings quality, two opposite arguments are put 
forward. On the one hand, debt can act as a disci-
plinary mechanism on managers as a result of the 
increased in- depth monitoring undertaken by debt-
holders (Jensen, 1986). Th e latter need to make sure 
that debt covenants are respected, which leads them 
to closely monitor fi rm performance using account-
ing information. Knowing that they are under high 
scrutiny, managers are under pressure to provide 
earnings that refl ect the true economic reality of the 
fi rm.
On the other hand, a positive relationship between 
leverage and earnings management can be expected 
for two reasons. First, disclosing higher earnings 
allows a better negotiation of the quantity of debt, as 
well as the cost of debt. Second, it helps to respect the 
debt contract and, more specifi cally, the constraints 
resulting from debt covenants (Mohrman, 1996). 
In the United States, Sweeney (1994) examined 130 
cases of accounting- based covenant violations in 
annual reports. She found that earnings tend to be 
managed to the upside when fi rms approach default. 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) studied a sample of 
94 fi rms that reported debt covenant violations in 
annual reports. Th ey showed that earnings are man-
aged upward in the year prior to violation and in 
the year of violation. DeAngelo et al. (1994) exam-
ined 76 distressed companies. Among the troubled 
fi rms that were close to a debt covenant violation, 
they expected to fi nd income- increasing actions as 
managers have incentives to avoid or defer the costs 
of a breach. However, managers of troubled compa-
nies appeared to deliberately reduce reported earn-
ings. Th e authors assumed managers use it as a way 
to show creditors their ability and willingness to 
seriously streamline operations. Ghosh and Moon 
(2010) documented a curvilinear relation between 
debt and earnings quality. Th e relationship is posi-
tive at low levels of debt and negative at high debt 
levels with an infl ection point around 41%. Finally, 
Franz et al. (2014) found that fi rms close to violation 
or in technical default of their debt covenants engage 
in higher levels of earnings management than far- 
from- violation fi rms. Overall, the direction and the 
signifi cance of the association between leverage and 
earnings quality remains an open question.
Th e global hospitality industry provides a rele-
vant and untapped setting to examine the associa-
tion between debt and earnings quality. First, due 
to their signifi cant investments in tangible assets 
(property, plant, and equipment), hospitality fi rms 
demand larger amounts of fi nancial debt than other 
industries (Singal, 2015; Li & Singal, 2019), which 
has several advantages. Compared to equity, debt 
notably allows tax reduction and avoids ownership 
structure dilution, knowing that debtholders prefer 
fi nancing tangible assets in comparison to intangible 
assets that cannot serve as collateral. Based on the 
results of a study covering 20 years and more than 
3,000 fi rms across industries, Singal (2015) demon-
strated that the hospitality and tourism industry has 
structural diff erences compared to other industries 
such as higher capital intensity and higher leverage, 
and that these diff erences provide “.  .  .  support for 
future research eff orts that may import results from 
the broader economy to the special case of Hospi-
tality and Tourism fi rms” (p. 116). Th e question of 
the validity and the direct import of research results 
from mainstream literature arises because substan-
tially higher levels of leverage can potentially alter 
the incentives outlined in the above paragraphs, for 
example, by exacerbating and amplifying them or, 
conversely, by mitigating or even canceling them 
through buff ering mechanisms.
Second, the literature on earnings management 
is relatively scarce in the hospitality industry. Parte 
Esteban and Jesus Such Devesa (2011) focused on 
reported earnings and demonstrated the impor-
tance of reaching certain earnings benchmarks in 
the Spanish hotel industry. In a related paper, Parte 
Esteban and Ferrer García (2014) examined the 
eff ect of fi rm characteristics on earnings quality 
using a sample of Spanish hotel fi rms. Th ey found 
that some key factors (i.e., internationalization, 
location, ownership structure, and audit function) 
infl uence earnings quality in hotel fi rms. Seetah 
(2017) studied the evolution of accounting quality 
in the Mauritian hospitality industry. Th e results 
showed that hospitality fi rms in Mauritius might 
have used income- decreasing accruals during the 
jhfm_28-1.indd   33 5/11/20   2:25 PM
34 C. PORETTI ET AL.
fi nancial crisis period and engaged in “big bath” 
practices. Finally, Gim et al. (2019) investigated 
whether franchise fi rms manage earnings more 
than non- franchise ones using a sample of U.S. 
restaurant fi rms. Th ey showed that franchise fi rms 
manage more earnings during growth phases, and 
that leverage is weaker in explaining earnings man-
agement for franchise restaurants. Recent empirical 
results on earnings management practices in the 
hospitality sector are thus lacking. Th is is all the 
more detrimental as this sector is characterized by 
high levels of leverage, which can modify relation-
ships between leverage and earnings management 
behavior previously observed in studies covering 
various industries.
Given the potential double- edged sword eff ect of 
fi nancial debt on earnings management, the high 
levels of leverage characterizing the hospitality 
industry (Li & Singal, 2019; Serrasqueiro & Nunes, 
2014; Tang & Jang, 2007), and the scant research on 
earnings management practices in the hospitality 
industry, we formulated a fi rst research question:
Research Question 1: How does fi nancial 
leverage act on earnings quality in the 
hospitality industry?
Impact of Institutions on Earnings Quality
Th e hospitality and the tourism industries are highly 
internationalized (D’Amore, 1998; Minghetti & 
Buhalis, 2010; Song et al., 2018). Companies from 
this sector are continuously looking for new mar-
kets to increase their market share, and compete 
with fi rms from all over the world. One key factor 
characterizing a country’s corporate governance 
environment is the legal protection of investors 
(La Porta et al., 1998). Investors can be protected 
from expropriation through the legal system, which 
includes both legal rules and the quality of their 
enforcement (La Porta et al., 2000).
Several studies showed that national institutions 
matter in terms of earnings quality. In particular, 
Ball et al. (2000) showed that earnings are less timely 
in incorporating losses in code- law countries com-
pared to common- law countries. Leuz et al. (2003) 
2 For more information: https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc -methodology.
3 Although data are provided on Datastream in local currencies by default, they can also be converted into a standard currency. For 
our study, all variables were directly retrieved in USD.
found that earnings management decreases with the 
level of investor protection because strong protec-
tion limits insiders’ ability to acquire private con-
trol benefi ts, which reduces incentives to mask fi rm 
performance. Th ese empirical studies support the 
idea that accounting outcomes are closely related to 
the institutional context (i.e., macro- mechanism of 
management monitoring).
Drawing from past literature, we use one of the 
World Bank Group’s governance indicators,2 namely 
regulatory quality, which varies across countries 
and years, to classify countries depending on their 
investor protection strength. Th is score is defi ned as 
refl ecting “perceptions of the ability of the govern-
ment to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development” (Kaufmann et al., 2009, p. 6).
Given the sharp intrinsic institutional diff erences 
across countries, the role of fi nancial leverage on 
earnings quality may actually depend on investor 
protection strength. Th is leads us to formulate a sec-
ond research question:
Research Question 2: How does investor 
protection strength infl uence the relationship 
between fi nancial leverage and earnings 
management in the hospitality industry?
Research Design
Sample Selection
Our empirical study is based on a worldwide sam-
ple that includes publicly traded fi rms available on 
Datastream from 2002 to 2016, from the “Travel & 
Leisure” Industry Classifi cation Benchmark (ICB). 
We started with all fi rms available in the database 
but we dropped fi rms from sub- industry group 
“Airlines”— as we focus on fi rms in the hospitality 
industry— as well as fi rms with missing data. Our 
fi nal sample includes 7,194 fi rm- year observations 
for a total of 642 unique fi rms in 26 countries.3
Table 1 shows the distribution of observations by 
sub- industry and by country. Th e most represented 
sub- industries are Restaurants and Bars (27%), fol-
lowed by Hotels (24%), Travel and Tourism (21%), 
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Recreational Services (16%), and Gambling (11%). 
Th e two most represented countries are Japan (28%) 
and the United States (17%).
Model and Main Variables
To test the impact of fi nancial leverage on earnings 
quality, we estimated the following model: _ ,  = 0 + 1 ∗ ,  
 + ,  + ,  (1)
In Equation (1), the dependent variable EARN-
INGS_Mi,t measures earnings management in year 
t for fi rm i. EARNINGS_Mi,t is the absolute value 
of abnormal accruals following either Jones (1991) 
(EARNINGS_M1i,t); Dechow et al. (1995) (EARN-
INGS_M2i,t); or Kothari et al. (2005) (EARNINGS_
M3i,t). Higher values of EARNINGS_M indicate 
higher earnings management (i.e., lower earnings 
quality). More details about the computation of the 
three measures of earnings management are pro-
vided in Appendix A.
Th e independent variable of interest is LEVER-
AGE, which we calculated as the ratio of total fi nan-
cial debt to total assets. To answer our fi rst research 
question, the coeffi  cient of interest is 1. If 1 is 
positive, then higher debt levels are associated with 
higher earnings management, which is detrimen-
tal to earnings quality. Such result would suggest 
that debtholders’ pressure encourages managers to 
reduce earnings quality to avoid breach of covenants 
or to decrease the cost of debt. However, if the 1 
coeffi  cient is negative, it will support an eff ective 
monitoring role by debtholders leading to the dis-
closure of accounting information of better quality.
To answer our second research question, we use 
the same model but we rely on two specifi cations. 
First, we estimate Equation (1) on two distinct sub- 
samples: fi rms in countries with a strong World Bank 
index and fi rms in countries with a weak World 
Bank index. Firms in countries with a score above 
the sample median are considered as having a strong 
World Bank index while the others have a weak 
World Bank index. Given that managers may have 
diff erent incentives to distort fi nancial information 
Table 1. Distribution of Firm- Year Observations by Sub- Industry and Country







Australia 80 56 30 23 52 241
Brazil 0 15 6 6 9 36
Canada 36 10 35 26 39 146
Chile 36 8 66 0 0 110
China 0 109 22 32 397 560
Croatia 0 106 0 10 20 136
Denmark 0 0 64 0 0 64
France 36 84 38 48 32 238
Germany 22 15 74 0 48 159
Greece 41 53 0 0 72 166
India 0 336 73 22 17 448
Indonesia 0 109 16 33 111 269
Italy 15 0 44 15 27 101
Japan 141 171 331 934 422 1,999
Mauritius 0 16 0 0 0 16
Mexico 15 33 5 30 0 83
Poland 0 15 0 16 24 55
Portugal 15 0 29 15 0 59
Spain 10 24 0 0 0 34
Sri Lanka 0 241 0 0 14 255
Sweden 32 13 20 0 5 70
Switzerland 10 0 15 0 30 55
Thailand 0 147 35 19 2 203
United Kingdom 52 30 67 197 75 421
United States 244 110 197 547 101 1,199
Vietnam 10 16 7 0 38 71
Total 795 1,717 1,174 1,973 1,535 7,194
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depending on the strength of investor protection 
(Leuz et al., 2003), we focus on the 1 coeffi  cient in 
each sub- group. Second, we also estimate Equation 
(2) where we include an interaction term between 
LEVERAGE and PROTECTION_STRONG. PRO-
TECTION_STRONG is a binary variable taking the 
value of one if the country has a score above the 
sample median of the World Bank regulatory qual-
ity score, and zero otherwise. Our focus is on 3 to 
answer our second research question. _ ,  = 0 + 1 ∗ ,  
 + 2 ∗ _ ,  
 + 3 ∗ ,  ∗ _ ,  
 + ,  + ,  (2)
Control Variables
In Equations (1) and (2), we include a vector of 
control variables that are usually used in the lit-
erature. We control for the size of the fi rm (SIZE) 
as Dechow and Dichev (2002) found that accruals 
quality is related to fi rm size. We control for growth 
opportunities (GROWTH_OPP) as fi rms with more 
growth opportunities, and thus with greater fi nanc-
ing needs, might have stronger incentives to disclose 
credible accounting information (Bonetti et al., 
2016). Bédard et al. (2004) found a negative infl u-
ence of profi tability on earnings management. We 
include the dummy variable LOSS, taking the value 
of one if net income is negative, and zero otherwise. 
Th e impact of accounting standards on the quality of 
accounting information has been a source of debate 
with mixed results (Soderstrom & Sun, 2007). As 
our sample is composed of fi rms that apply IFRS, 
US GAAP, or Local GAAP, we control for the poten-
tial eff ect of accounting standards heterogeneity on 
earnings management. We use a dummy variable 
IFRS that takes the value of one if the fi rm applies 
IFRS, and zero otherwise. In addition, we use a 
dummy variable US_GAAP that takes the value of 
one if the fi rm applies US GAAP, and zero other-
wise. Th e literature showed that fi rms audited by a 
Big Four company manage earnings less (DeFond & 
Zhang, 2014; Francis, Michas, & Seavey, 2013). To 
control for this eff ect, we use a dummy variable BIG4 
4 Th e mean leverage is relatively comparable across sub- industries and ranges from 0.270 for Gambling to 0.309 for Travel and 
Tourism and Recreational Services.
that takes the value of one if the fi rm’s external audi-
tor is a member of one of the Big Four accounting 
fi rms, and zero otherwise. Finally, we include sub- 
industry, country, and year fi xed eff ects to control 
for unobservable factors that may impact earnings 
quality. Standard errors are adjusted for heterosce-
dasticity and fi rm- level clustering, consistent with 
Petersen (2009) and all variables are winsorized (2% 
of the distribution). Appendix B provides detailed 
descriptions of all variables used in our models.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of all vari-
ables used in this study for the full sample as well 
as for the two sub- samples. Our three alternative 
measures of earnings quality produce substantially 
similar results. Th e mean value varies between 0.056 
for EARNINGS_M1 and 0.058 for EARNINGS_M3. 
Th e mean value of LEVERAGE is 0.291.4 Th is value 
is in line with Li and Singal (2019) who analyzed 
U.S. hospitality data from 1992– 2012. Comparing 
the two sub- samples, we can see that all variables 
(except LOSS) are higher for the strong institutions 
sub- sample.
Figure 1 completes our description of fi nancial 
leverage. Overall, LEVERAGE has been decreas-
ing until 2013, with a minimum of 27.1% reached 
that year. Since then, it has been slightly increasing. 
Comparing the two institutional contexts, we can 
see that the mean leverage in countries with stron-
ger institutions is almost systematically higher than 
in other countries. Moreover, since 2011, opposite 
trends have occurred in the two sub- samples, with a 
tendency toward more leverage in the strong World 
Bank index sub- sample, while the opposite is true 
for the weak World Bank index sub- sample. Th ese 
contrasting trends over time justify the use of time 
fi xed eff ects in our model.
Multivariate Analysis
We report our main fi ndings for the estimation of 
Equation (1) in Table 3. In columns (a) to (c) of 
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 Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Full Sample (N = 7,194) Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.
EARNINGS_M1 0.056 0.053 0.000 0.039 0.229
EARNINGS_M2 0.057 0.059 0.000 0.039 0.311
EARNINGS_M3 0.058 0.059 0.000 0.039 0.303
LEVERAGE 0.291 0.225 0.000 0.276 0.855
PROTECTION_STRONG 0.499 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
SIZE 12.383 1.946 8.107 12.271 16.629
GROWTH_OPP 2.575 3.922 −5.976 1.614 22.034
LOSS 0.210 0.407 0.000 0.000 1.000
IFRS 0.204 0.403 0.000 0.000 1.000
US_GAAP 0.174 0.379 0.000 0.000 1.000
BIG4 0.498 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
Strong World Bank Index (N = 3,591)
EARNINGS_M1 0.057 0.054 0.000 0.040 0.229
EARNINGS_M2 0.059 0.061 0.000 0.040 0.311
EARNINGS_M3 0.059 0.060 0.000 0.041 0.303
LEVERAGE 0.308 0.233 0.000 0.294 0.855
SIZE 12.775 2.022 8.107 12.681 16.629
GROWTH_OPP 2.960 4.575 −5.976 1.836 22.034
LOSS 0.208 0.406 0.000 0.000 1.000
IFRS 0.232 0.422 0.000 0.000 1.000
US_GAAP 0.325 0.469 0.000 0.000 1.000
BIG4 0.543 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000
Weak World Bank Index (N = 3,603)
EARNINGS_M1 0.055 0.052 0.000 0.038 0.229
EARNINGS_M2 0.056 0.058 0.000 0.038 0.311
EARNINGS_M3 0.056 0.057 0.000 0.038 0.303
LEVERAGE 0.275 0.215 0.000 0.254 0.855
SIZE 11.992 1.784 8.107 11.958 16.629
GROWTH_OPP 2.192 3.091 −5.976 1.441 22.034
LOSS 0.213 0.409 0.000 0.000 1.000
IFRS 0.176 0.381 0.000 0.000 1.000
US_GAAP 0.023 0.150 0.000 0.000 1.000
BIG4 0.453 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000
Note: All variables are defi ned in Appendix B.
Figure 1. Evolution of the Mean Leverage for the 2002–2016 Period (Strong versus Weak Institutional Context)
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Table 3, the coeffi  cients on LEVERAGE are nega-
tive and signifi cant, implying that higher levels of 
leverage are associated with lower earnings manage-
ment (i.e., higher earnings quality). Overall, these 
results off er consistent evidence on the fi rm- level 
monitoring role of debtholders over fi nancial infor-
mation quality through fi nancial leverage. Table 3 
also provides evidence on other factors aff ecting the 
propensity of hospitality fi rms to manage earnings. 
Large fi rms (SIZE) disclose earnings of higher qual-
ity, whereas less profi table fi rms (LOSS) have lower 
earnings quality, which is in line with prior studies 
(e.g., Bédard et al., 2004).
Table 4 reports the main results to answer our 
second research question. Columns (a) to (c) doc-
ument a signifi cantly negative 3 coeffi  cient on the 
interaction term (LEVERAGE * PROTECTION_
STRONG), meaning that the positive impact of 
leverage on earnings quality occurs only when insti-
tutions are strong.
Next, using the regulatory quality score to split 
our sample, we fi nd that the positive and signifi cant 
association between leverage and earnings quality 
holds only for fi rms in strong institutional contexts 
(columns [d] to [f] of Table 4), which is in line with 
the results found in columns (a) to (c). Th us, we sup-
port the idea that, in countries with stronger insti-
tutions, the relation between leverage and earnings 
quality is signifi cant and positive as institutions in 
place protect shareholders from managers’ misbe-
havior (i.e., earnings management in our case). On 
the contrary, in columns (g) to (i), the association 
between leverage and earnings quality is not signif-
icant. In countries with a relatively weak regulatory 
environment, debt does not act as an eff ective mech-
anism to increase the quality of fi nancial reporting. 
It is interesting to note that the association is neither 
signifi cant nor positive, which does not support the 
hypothesis of opportunism of managers.
Additional Analyses
In this section, we ran additional tests to ensure our 
results are not driven by specifi c countries or by the 
debt maturity structure. We also address the endog-
eneity issue.
Table 3. The Eff ect of Leverage on Earnings Management
EARNINGS_M1 EARNINGS_M2 EARNINGS_M3
(a) (b) (c)
LEVERAGE −0.01*** −0.01** −0.01**
(−2.59) (−2.14) (−2.26)
SIZE −0.01*** −0.01*** −0.01***
(−8.62) (−8.55) (−8.42)
GROWTH_OPP 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.44) (1.24) (1.38)
LOSS 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01**
(3.27) (3.36) (2.45)
IFRS −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(−0.21) (−0.11) (−0.32)
US_GAAP 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.35) (0.43) (0.48)
BIG4 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.76) (0.69) (0.67)
Constant 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.14***
(10.10) (10.04) (10.47)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Sub- industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Firm Firm
Observations 7,194 7,194 7,194
Adjusted R- squared 0.13 0.11 0.10
F- statistic 9.99*** 9.28*** 8.91***
 Note: All variables are defi ned in Appendix B. OLS regressions with robust z- statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
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Exclusion of Some Countries
To ensure that some countries do not drive our 
results, we 1) excluded over- represented coun-
tries and 2) over- leveraged countries. As Japan and 
the United States represent 45% of our sample, we 
excluded these two countries and re- ran our tests. 
Our (untabulated) results remain the same. Th en, 
as Spain and Portugal have the highest leverage lev-
els using the LEVERAGE variable, with 49.7% and 
43.8% respectively, we removed observations from 
these two countries. Once again, our (untabulated) 
results hold.
Debt Maturity Structure
Our results concerning the impact of leverage on 
earnings quality may depend upon the debt maturity 
structure (the proportion of short- and long- term 
debt with respect to total assets). We decompose the 
variable LEVERAGE into its two components: long- 
term debt to total assets (LTDTA) and short- term 
debt to total assets (STDTA). Th e coeffi  cients associ-
ated with LTDTA are similar to those obtained with 
LEVERAGE, while the coeffi  cients on STDTA are 
not signifi cant (results not reported). Th ese results 
indicate that it is the long- term debt portion of our 
leverage measure that positively and signifi cantly 
impacts earnings quality.
Endogeneity
One may argue that we face an endogeneity issue 
because fi nancial leverage is not randomly deter-
mined (i.e., not an exogenous variable). In other 
words, fi rms have various reasons to increase or 
decrease their leverage level.
Table 4. The Eff ect of Leverage on Earnings Management in Diff erent Institutional Contexts
Full Sample Strong World Bank Index Weak World Bank Index
E_M1 E_M2 E_M3 E_M1 E_M2 E_M3 E_M1 E_M2 E_M3
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f ) (g) (h) (i)
LEVERAGE −0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.03*** −0.03*** −0.03*** 0.00 0.00 0.00
(−0.37) (0.08) (0.05) (−3.60) (−3.34) (−3.48) (0.00) (0.36) (0.36)
PROTECTION_STRONG 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.57) (0.68) (0.85)
LEVERAGE *PROTECTION_STRONG −0.02** −0.03** −0.03**
(−2.27) (−2.45) (−2.54)
SIZE −0.01*** −0.01*** −0.01*** −0.01*** −0.01*** −0.01*** −0.01*** −0.01*** −0.01***
(−8.61) (−8.53) (−8.40) (−7.26) (−7.34) (−7.00) (−5.99) (−5.68) (−5.80)
GROWTH_OPP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**
(1.37) (1.17) (1.30) (0.27) (0.15) (0.28) (2.13) (2.00) (2.07)
LOSS 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 −0.00
(3.12) (3.21) (2.29) (3.73) (3.71) (3.20) (0.54) (0.61) (−0.27)
IFRS −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(−0.23) (−0.13) (−0.34) (−0.40) (−0.28) (−0.57) (0.19) (0.26) (0.22)
US_GAAP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.03*** −0.03*** −0.03***
(0.27) (0.33) (0.38) (0.99) (1.09) (1.29) (−3.29) (−3.18) (−3.16)
BIG4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.89) (0.84) (0.82) (0.88) (1.01) (1.01) (0.54) (0.37) (0.31)
Constant 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17***
(9.63) (9.54) (10.05) (8.29) (8.32) (8.73) (10.45) (10.14) (10.16)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sub- industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Observations 7,194 7,194 7,194 3,591 3,591 3,591 3,603 3,603 3,603
Adjusted R- squared 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.08
F- statistic 9.77*** 9.27*** 8.81*** 9.76*** 9.25*** 8.91*** 27.28*** 25.97*** 25.60***
Note: All variables are defi ned in Appendix B. EARNINGS_M variables are relabeled E_M for sake of space in this table. OLS regressions with 
robust z- statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
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Th e results of the Durbin- Wu- Hausman test 
(not reported) show that we have to reject the null 
hypothesis (at the 1% threshold) of our LEVERAGE 
variable being exogenous (with the three earnings 
management models). To ensure that our results do 
not suff er from endogeneity, we consider that the 
LEVERAGE variable is determined by fi rm- level, 
industry-level, and country- level factors. As a con-
sequence, we take into account this issue and imple-
ment a two- step procedure using a two stage least 
squares (2SLS) regression including TANGIBILITY 
(the ratio of fi xed tangible assets to total assets), 
and GROWTH_OPP (the market to book ratio) as 
instruments. Th e Sargan- Hansen test (J test) result 
is not signifi cant, which confi rms the validity of the 
instruments. Overall, the additional (untabulated) 
results support our main fi ndings regarding our two 
research questions, even aft er correcting for this 
endogeneity issue.
Conclusion
Various studies document that fi rms in the hospi-
tality industry have higher levels of fi nancial lever-
age than other industries (Li & Singal, 2019; Singal, 
2015; Tang & Jang, 2007). While the determinants 
of leverage in this industry have been widely stud-
ied, the consequences have received little academic 
attention. Our study intends to fi ll this gap and 
focuses on the impact of fi nancial leverage on earn-
ings quality in the hospitality industry. Based on 
a large sample of fi rms from 26 countries, we fi nd 
that fi rms with higher fi nancial leverage manage less 
their earnings (i.e., disclose earnings of higher qual-
ity). More interestingly, we document that this result 
is conditional on the institutional context. Using the 
regulatory quality score from the World Bank index 
as a proxy for the strength of the institutional con-
text, we fi nd that the positive impact of leverage on 
earnings quality holds only in countries with strong 
institutional context, that is to say when institutions 
in place protect shareholders from managers’ misbe-
havior (i.e., earnings management in our case). We 
ran various analyses to make sure that our results 
are robust to specifi c methodological issues.
Our study provides some practical and theoret-
ical implications. From an investor point of view, 
investing in fi rms that disclose earnings of quality 
(refl ecting the true economic reality of the fi rm) is an 
important matter. By providing evidence that hospi-
tality fi rms with high leverage disclose earnings of 
better quality if they are incorporated in countries 
with strong institutions, we help investors in their 
capital allocation process. Investing in hospitality 
fi rms from countries with weak institutions should 
be made with caution, and the greater underlying risk 
of signifi cant earnings management— potentially 
misleading investors— has to be accounted for.
Next, this study provides useful insights to top 
managers and boards of directors by documenting 
that using fi nancial debt has some positive conse-
quences in terms of earnings quality in countries 
with stronger investor protection. Th us, in line with 
Jensen (1986), engaging fi rms to fi nance projects 
with debt instead of equity may improve the align-
ment of managers’ and shareholders’ interests. It is 
well- known that fi nancial leverage reduces the aver-
age cost of capital because of a tax advantage, avoids 
dilution of ownership structure, and puts pressure 
on managers that may be tempted to invest in nega-
tive net present values projects. Our results support 
the idea that more debt also reduces the informa-
tion asymmetry between shareholders and manag-
ers by encouraging the latter to disclose earnings of 
higher quality.
Moreover, it is crucial to place our research in a 
more general context concerning the transformation 
of the hospitality industry with respect to the asset- 
light strategy, which is generally associated with a 
decrease in tangible assets and debt levels (Sohn 
et al., 2014). Assuming that hospitality fi rms will 
continue their shift  toward more “asset- lightness,” 
this will result in lower proportions of fi xed asset 
in the balance sheets, and most probably in lower 
debt levels. Indeed, various studies document that 
fi rms with more tangible assets can borrow more 
because their fi xed assets can serve as collateral, and 
at a lower cost (e.g. Norton, 1995; Rajan & Zingales, 
1995; Sheel, 1994; Tang & Jang, 2007). Reducing the 
proportion of fi xed assets might thus reduce debt 
fi nancing opportunities and the underlying ben-
efi ts. Meanwhile, there is a tendency toward more 
fi nancial leverage in some sub- industries (Li & Sin-
gal, 2019). In consequence, these trends are likely to 
indirectly increase or decrease the quality of fi nan-
cial information disclosed by hospitality companies.
Our study is not without limitations. First of all, 
we solely focus on publicly traded fi rms, which limits 
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the generalizability of our results to private fi rms. 
Moreover, running a large- scale hospitality- focused 
study inevitably leads to pooling together sub- 
industries with diff erent characteristics. Although we 
included sub- industry fi xed eff ects in our tests on top 
of controlling for various characteristics, the useful-
ness of the results might be limited for specifi c sub- 
industries. Second, we only address the quality of 
accounting information through earnings manage-
ment. However, other characteristics of accounting 
information may be impacted by fi nancial leverage, 
like earnings persistence (e.g. Jeon et al., 2006) or 
earnings forecasts (e.g. Smeral, 2016). Th ird, investi-
gating how the asset- light strategy infl uences leverage 
in an international context, and as a result earnings 
quality, might also be an interesting direction for 
future research with access to the relevant data. In 
particular, as all sub- industries in the hospitality 
sector are not subject to the same trends and modes 
of operation (e.g., franchise, management contract, 
etc.), comparisons between sub- sectors and modes 
of operations would provide further insight into the 
results. Th us, more research is defi nitively needed on 
fi nancial information in the hospitality industry.
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Appendix A. Earnings Management Models
To ensure the robustness of our results, we use 
three measures of earnings management following 
Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995), and Kothari et 
al. (2005). In the three models, the abnormal (dis-
cretionary) component of accruals ( , ) provides 
indirect evidence of earnings management behavior 
and, thus, of lower earnings quality.
In the three models, ,  is the total accru-
als of fi rm i in year t, defi ned as net income before 
extraordinary items minus cash fl ows from opera-
tions. In the Jones (1991) model, total accruals are 
explained by the change in sales (∆S , ), and prop-
erty, plant, and equipment ( , ). All variables 
included in the model are scaled by lagged total 
assets ( , −1) to reduce heteroscedasticity:
Th e Dechow et al. (1995) model expands the 
Jones model by removing the variation in accounts 
receivable (∆ , ) from variation in sales:
Th e Kothari et al. (2005) model includes the 
lagged return on assets ( , −1):
 
 
Appendix B. List of Variables and Measurements
Appendix Table 1. List of Variables and Measurements
Variable Measure
EARNINGS_M1 Absolute value of abnormal accruals measured using the Jones (1991) model
EARNINGS_M2 Absolute value of abnormal accruals measured using the Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) model
EARNINGS_M3 Absolute value of abnormal accruals measured using the Kothari et al. (2005) model
LEVERAGE (Long- term debt + Short- term debt) / Total assets
PROTECTION_STRONG Dummy variable equal to 1 if the score from the World Bank index (regulatory quality) for the corresponding 
country- year is greater than the sample median, 0 otherwise
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets
GROWTH_OPP Market value of equity / Book value of equity
LOSS Dummy variable equal to 1 if the fi rm reports a loss in the current year, 0 otherwise
IFRS Dummy variable equal to 1 if the fi rm applies IFRS, 0 otherwise
US_GAAP Dummy variable equal to 1 if the fi rm applies US GAAP, 0 otherwise
BIG4 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the fi rm’s external auditor is a Big Four company, 0 otherwise
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